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Abstract
We introduce, in a multiple agents moral hazard setting, a status variable which
reflects an agent’s claim to social recognition in her work. Status is a scarce resource
so that increasing an agent’s status requires that another agent’s status is decreased.
High status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for monetary com-
pensations while well-paid agents care more about recognition so that they would
exert a higher effort in exchange for a higher status. We obtain results coherent with
actual management practices and management experts recommendations such as:
(i) status and income should be complements; (ii) egalitarianism is desirable in a
static context; (iii) in a long-term work relationship, promotions are more effective
than direct monetary incentives.
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1 Introduction
Although economists have put out a substantial amount of research on work incentives,
their approach, remains at odds with much of the management and organization litera-
ture on the subject. The logic of using money to induce effort which is the main focus
of economic analysis is definitely a key feature of actual incentive packages. Yet, a mere
description of monetary incentive schemes falls short of providing a full account of man-
agement practices. Even in cases where direct monetary incentives are used extensively,
as for instance for sales force employees, they are associated with other types of benefits
ranking from travel or merchandise to symbolic rewards like trophies or medals. It is
often argued that merchandise, although a poor substitute for money according to stan-
dard economic theory, is an effective means of providing incentives because of its trophy
value: it reminds the winner and others of her/his high past performance (see Nelson,
1994, Wood, 1998). Wood (1998) reports that Will Haffer vice-president of sales with
Bowne-publishing, while reminiscing about his winning a large screen TV said “Actually
the main reason I wanted it was that it was the top prize. I could afford to buy a big
screen but it was not the same as winning it.”
Whereas the above examples suggest that there are some benefits in stressing differ-
ences among employees, the opposite point is often made that it is appropriate to adopt an
egalitarian approach by de-emphasizing symbolic differences (see Pfeffer, 1994). Human
resource management in companies known for their outstanding performances provides
striking illustrations such as the manager of the contract manufacturer Selectron giving
up his/her private office (see section 4 below for more examples). In the present paper we
propose a simple framework in which the desirability of using symbols to stress differences
among organization members can be assessed.
The need for recognition is typically viewed as immaterial and nonetheless a vital one.
In 1805 John Adams said “The desire of the esteem of others is as real a want as hunger
- and the neglect and contempt of the world as severe a pain as the gout or stone...”1
1Quoted in Fussell (1983).
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The importance of social recognition in professional life is well illustrated by the following
remark by a steelworker reported by Terkel (1972): “I would like to see a building, say the
Empire State, I would like to see on one side of it a foot-wide strip from top to bottom
with the name of every bricklayer, the name of every electrician, with all the names. ...
Picasso can point to a painting. What can I point to? A writer can point to a book.
Everybody should have something to point to.”
Typically, sociologists use social status to capture the need for social recognition. As
defined by Weber (1922), social status is “an effective claim to social esteem in terms of
negative or positive privileges”. He insists that a status ranking is not directly related
to wealth or income though it may be affected by them. Empirically, there is obviously
a strong correlation between social status and material well-being. There is for instance
a clear positive correlation between the ranking of occupations in term of social status
by respondents in surveys and the average income in these occupations. However, the
status ranking of occupations may be much better explained if education is added along
with income as an explanatory variable (see Perrot, 1999, for details). Hence the theory
of Veblen (1899), according to which status stems mostly from relative income or wealth,
is somewhat restrictive.2 An opposite argument could actually be made for the reverse
causality: a higher status is the basis for earning a higher income. There is some experi-
mental evidence, both from psychologists (Jemmott and Gonzalez, 1989) and economists
(Ball and Eckel, 1996, Ball and Eckel, 1998, and Ball, Eckel, Grossman and Zame, 2001)
that an exogenous and random distribution of status among individuals has a significant
impact on their relative performance.3 Belliveau et ali. (1996) study how CEO compen-
sations are affected by the CEO’s status relative to that of the compensation committee
2See Weiss and Feshtman (1998) survey for references on the implications of Veblen’s theory in eco-
nomic models. In this tradition, and closer to our preoccupation, Fershtman and Hvide and Weiss (2001)
paper studies how status concern (i.e., ranking based on workers comparison of their wage to the wage of
other workers within the same firm) affects wage distribution. Their main result is that status concern
increase wage inequality.
3Ball et al. (2001) created status by arbitrarily awarding a “gold star” (a pin) through a “ceremony”
to half of the subjects. Next the subjects were asked to play a standard buyers/sellers game (oral double
auction). They found that status was a significantly positive (and unconscious –the gold star was never
mentioned in the strategy the players reported to follow) determinant of a subject’s earnings. The result
holds whether it was clear or not to the participants that the gold star was awarded on an arbitrary basis.
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chair. They find that, all things equal, high status CEOs matched with low status com-
pensation chairs are significantly better paid than low status CEOs matched with high
status compensation chairs.
Symbols in organizations are a means of commanding recognition by others. Even
when monetary incentives are widely used, companies devise ways of providing their
successful employees with conspicuous awards. For instance it is a common practice to
grant top sales people medals, rings, sculptures, plaques and so on, handed out during
lavish ceremonies (see Nelson 1994). Oftentimes, recognition for deserving employees
is institutionalized through exclusive clubs such as the “100 Percent Club” at Norwest
Corporation Financial Services or the “Top E´lite Club” at AGF Insurance which honors
the top one hundred sales agents each year. Recognition is therefore a key feature of
work incentives even when output is easily measured. Yet it would be misleading to view
recognition as a cheap substitute for money. A common theme in organization theory
is that there is some cost associated with a differential treatment of people performing
similar tasks. There has been a substantial body of research, in the wake of Adams (1965),
concerned with the impact of “unequal” or “unfair” treatment on work motivation. Indeed
according to Adams’ equity theory, people react to inequity by making up for it. For
instance they lower their input if they feel that what they obtain in return is insufficient,
relative to what others around them obtain.4 While symbolic differentiation is enjoyed by
those with high status, it is disliked by those with low status who, as a result, loose some
motivation. Recognition has a cost because it is valued in relative terms: what matters is
earning more recognition than others. The framework presented here captures this cost
of granting recognition in a context where there is a benefit to treating workers differently
for incentive purposes.
We consider a simple multi-agents moral hazard problem and allow for an agent’s
preferences to depend on her status as well as income and effort. Our specification of
preferences has the property that high status agents are willing to exert more effort in
exchange for additional income while better paid agents are willing to exert more effort
4For economic arguments against large pay differences see Milgrom (1988) and Lazear (1989).
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in exchange for an improved status. As sociologists would put it, agents exhibit a taste
for status congruence: those with high status are more eager to earn a large income while
those with a high income strive to obtain a status in line with their income ranking. In
Section 2, we argue that this is coherent with results in the management and organization
literature.
Our results differ depending on whether the work relationship is long term or short
term. In a short term (once and for all) relationship, status in the organisation, which
can be thought of as a rank in a formal hierarchy, may not be handed out as a reward
for good past performances. Then the relevant question is whether an employer would ex
ante chose to differentiate status among a-priori identical workers. In line with Adams’
equity principle we find that this is not a good management practice. We first show that
individuals with a higher status should receive a higher expected wage. This is coherent
with the observed complementarity between status and income. The egalitarian result
may then be understood as follows. For a fixed status allocation, the principal benefits
from taking advantage of the substitutability between status and income by paying a
lower expected wage to those agents with higher status. This, however, contradicts the
requirement that status and income should be complements. Hence only a flat hierarchy
may be optimal. We conclude that introducing symbolic differentiation among workers
performing similar tasks is costly for an organization. Although agents with high status
are more responsive to monetary incentives, the resulting benefits are outweighed by the
impact of a lower motivation to work of those with lower status. This short term result
emphasizes the cost of status differentiation often stigmatised in the management and
human ressource management literature.
In order to bring in the benefits of differentiation, we adopt a long term perspective
and consider an organization comprised of overlapping generations of agents. We show
that the optimal solution for the organization involves giving young agents a status as low
as possible along with no monetary incentives. Their motivation to work stems solely from
the prospect of being promoted. Old agents are promoted and are granted a higher status
and a higher expected income. For incentive purposes promotions are more substantial
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for those who have been successful in the past; they end up with prestigious positions paid
above their marginal productivity. Because individuals’ preferences exhibit positive cross
effects between status and money, symbolic and material rewards reinforce each other.
By concentrating both types of compensations in the same time period and in the same
state of nature, the organisation exploits their complementarity to reduce the total wage
bill. Although this differential treatment of older employees reduces instantaneous profit,
the loss is more than compensated by the benefit resulting from the added incentives for
junior employees. We show that these results are robust to the introduction of income
risk aversion, a case where a standard repeated moral hazard model would prescribe to
smooth consumption over time (see for instance Rogerson, 1985, and Chiappori et al.,
1994).5
Our results show that career profiles differ greatly depending on whether or not the
employer may commit to long term incentive schemes. Without commitment the em-
ployer chooses to introduce limited symbolic differentiation which usually translates into
a relatively flat hierarchy. Monetary compensations are performance based so that wages
should reflect productivity differences and should not depend too much on the employee’s
tenure with the organization. In contrast, an employer that is able to commit organizes
an internal labor market where pay is attached to jobs, rewards are delayed in time and
a larger income is associated with more recognition (e.g. a higher rank in the hierarchy).
Differentiation among junior workers is limited and there are substantial differences in
rank and pay for more senior employees. Whereas wage differences are small early in
the career they become very substantial and reflect productivity differences as tenure in-
creases. A comparison of job tenures and career profiles in Japan and the US illustrates
the empirical relevance of these results.
We describe an agent’s preferences in Section 2, with particular attention to the sources
of cross effects between status and income. Section 3 presents the organization and the
way status may be allocated among agents. The egalitarian solution in a short-term
5Becker, Murphy and Werning (2000) also find that when status and income are complements risk-
averse people may be willing to take gambles (for more on this point see section 3.2 and section 6).
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setting and the optimality of incentives based on promotions when the relationship is
long-term are derived in Section 4 and Sections 5 and 6 repectively. Section 7 illustrates
the empirical relevance of our results through a comparison of job tenures and career
profiles in Japan and the US and Section 8 concludes.
2 Preferences
We consider the provision of work incentives to agents whose effort level is unobservable.
If, as is usually assumed, an agent’s preferences are fully characterized by a taste for
money and a distaste for effort, incentives may be provided through monetary rewards and
penalties. As we argued in the introduction, actual incentive procedures typically involve
many non-monetary attributes. Although some of these attributes clearly provide material
benefits (more independence, more influence, better work conditions) many others are
symbolic and their value to employees stems mostly from the social or psychological
benefit they entail (self esteem or social recognition). In this section we describe how this
symbolic dimension may enter into an agent’s preferences. We use the concept of status
to summarize the overall access to those psychological or social benefits that an employee
may secure through her position in the organization. Following the work by Frank (1984)
we assume that status is rooted in tastes.6
We postulate the following utility function:
u(w, s, e) = sw − ψ(e), s ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, e ≥ 0.
where s is status, w is wage income and e is effort. The disutility of work, ψ, is taken to
be a strictly increasing, strictly convex and twice continuously differentiable function.
A2 ψ′(e) > 0 ψ′′(e) > 0 for e ≥ 0.
This specification reflects in a simple manner the agents’ taste for money and status
and their distaste for effort. Setting status equal to 1 yields as a special case the standard
6For a discussion of this hypothesis see Frank (1985). In Frank’s (1984) pioneering work status stems
from relative income ranking.
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quasi-linear utility of a risk neutral agent, so that our results may be readily compared with
predictions of standard moral hazard framework. Linearity with respect to wage indicates
that agents are risk neutral regarding income. In subsequent sections, we discuss how our
results may be affected if this assumption is relaxed.7 The requirement that status and
wage should be positive is a normalization. Utility could easily be rewritten to allow for
non zero lower bounds. The important point is that there are such lower bounds. It is not
essential for our results that at the minimal income an agent derives no added satisfaction
from an increase in status or that at the minimal status level an agent does not benefit
from a larger income.
Since income and status are both positively valued, indifference curves relating these
two variables for a given effort level are strictly decreasing. This reflects the substitution
between status and income: an agent is willing to accept a lower pay if she is given a
more prestigious position in the organization, and conversely. However preferences over
status and income are strictly convex so that there is not a perfect substitution between
these two variables: a prestigious title does not compensate for the absence of wages, nor
does a good wage make up for the contempt of others.
Utility also exhibits positive cross effects between status and income. These cross
effects have important implications for the income-effort and status-effort tradeoffs.8 For-
mally, the marginal rate of substitution between effort and income is decreasing in status
while the marginal rate of substitution between effort and status is decreasing in income.
Here marginal rates of substitution are respectively the slopes of indifference curves in the
effort/income and effort/status spaces. In other words, a higher status induces a greater
willingness to exert effort in exchange for some additional income and a higher income
induces a greater willingness to exert effort in exchange for an improved status. Figures 1
depicts the indifference curves in the effort/income space when status varies (the arrows
represent the marginal rates of substitution).
7The interpretation of linearity with respect to status is provided in section 7.
8These cross effects matter because preferences are also defined over effort levels. If preferences were
defined on status and income alone, then taking the log of the Cobb-Douglas utility would wipe out cross
effects with no change in preferences. They also matter because we consider situations involving risk and
intertemporal substitution.
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These cross effects may be best interpreted by relating them to the sociological theory
of status, the psychological analysis of work motivation and the conventional wisdom
prevailing among management practitioners.
We first consider the impact of a change in status on the income/effort tradeoff. One
obvious prediction of our specification of the agent’s preferences is that, for a given level
of monetary incentives, an agent should be all the more productive that she has a high
status. The literature on job satisfaction suggests that a higher status enhances work
commitment. On the one hand, status is closely related to the need for recognition which
has been found to be a key factor in job satisfaction (e.g. Dunette, Campbell and Hakel,
1967). On the other hand, many studies have shown that a low job satisfaction tends to
result in high turnover and absenteeism rates.9 Empirically Tahlin (1999) found in a study
on job mobility in Sweden that everything else being equal people with low status (i.e.,
Treiman’s, 1977 prestige score) are more likely to make a voluntary job shift than people
with high status. It should be expected that a low satisfaction also results in shirking
which, contrary to absence and resignation, is not observable.10 A positive effect of status
on productivity has been found by Greenberg (1988) in a study on office reallocation: this
author found that a group of employees temporarily moved to lower-status offices lowered
their performance while lower-status employees assigned to better offices increased their
output. Finally, Tsui et al. (1992) found that workforce heterogeneity (i.e. mixing
different sex groups or ethnic groups) had a negative impact on work commitment for
white men whereas this impact was small for women and minorities. To explain this
difference they argue that white men feel that their status is deteriorated if they work
with women or minorities while the latter may feel that their status is enhanced when
they hold positions comparable to those held by white males11.
9See for instance Day and Hamblin (1964), Baum and Youngblood (1975).
10Many studies have shown that there is a positive correlation between job satisfaction and quality of
services (see Varma et al. (1999). In contrast researchers like Vroom (1964) failed to establish a clear
relationship between job satisfaction and productivity. This may be due in part to the fact that a high job
satisfaction is sometimes associated with groups known as the “happiness for lunch bunch” who mostly
enjoy the social life associated with the work place (see McCroskey, Larson and Knapp, 1971).
11They actually found that women working mostly with men had a high degree of attachment to their
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We now examine how the trade-off between effort and status is affected by a person’s
income. According to our specification of preferences, richer agents care more about their
status in the sense that they are willing to exert more effort in order to improve it. The
hierarchy of needs proposed by Maslow (1954) provides a nice interpretation of this phe-
nomenon. Maslow argues that there is a five levels hierarchy of human needs ranking
from bottom to top: physiological needs, safety needs, social needs, esteem needs and
self-actualization needs. Higher level needs correspond to less material (more psychologi-
cal) preoccupations. A person develops a taste for higher level needs only after fulfilling
those at lower levels. In the present context, income is the means of fulfilling material
satisfaction while status is the means of fulfilling psychological satisfaction. Then, indi-
viduals with low income are mostly preoccupied with material needs and care little about
status while those with higher income having satisfied their material needs are mostly
concerned about increasing their status. Various observations, either in the work place
or in broader social contexts, illustrate the relevance of Maslow’s construction. Certers
and Bugertal (1966) find evidence that factors at the top of Maslow’s hierarchy play a
more important role for employees earning higher wages. This is consistent with the logic
applied by practitioners when they use non monetary compensations. A human resource
management guide indicates that using merchandise to reward employees is inappropriate
for those earning low wages while such prizes are highly valued by those who are paid suf-
ficiently well (see Nelson, 1994). Similarly, rich people seeking social recognition through
the funding of charity, fine arts or higher education reflects such a shift in tastes caused
by a higher income.12
In the next section we present the organization and in particular we describe how
status may be allocated among agents.
job.
12For instance it has been observed that children with high income parents typically select high status
positions (see Treiman and Ganzeboom, 1990 and Lillard and Reville, 1997). On a more anecdotal note,
Cornellius Vanderbilt Whitney earning a Ph.D. for the sheer pleasure of being referred to as Doctor
Whitney illustrates this appetite for status among rich people (see Fussell, 1983).
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3 The Organization.
3.1 Production.
We consider an organization (bureau, subdivision, firm,...) supervised by a risk-neutral
principal. There are n ≥ 2 workers identified by an index i = 1, ..., n. They are assumed
to be ex-ante identical individuals, hired to do the same type of work. That is, there is no
a priori legitimate motive for treating them differently. The principal aims at maximizing
expected profit, with profit pi defined by
pi(Q,w1, ...wn) = Q−
n∑
i=1
wi.(1)
where Q =
∑n
i=1 qi is total output (its price is normalized to 1) and wi is the wage paid
to agent i.
Each worker contributes to the collective outcome by exerting an effort ei ≥ 0. The
harder agent i works (the higher ei is), the larger is the probability of a high output
for the unit. Formally, individual i contributes to the total output for an amount qi
which may be either high qi = q, with probability µ(ei) or low qi = q, with probability
1− µ(ei) (q > q > 0). Individual output, qi, is verifiable. That is, contrary to Lazear and
Rosen (1981) where only relative performance is observable, here absolute performance is
observable. This is a case where direct individual monetary incentives are particularly
appropriate. Under our assumptions any departure from these direct
incentive contracts may be ascribed to the introduction of the social status motive. The
probability of a high performance for agent i, µ(ei), increases with ei at a decreasing rate
(the impact of effort on performance declines for larger effort levels). The function µ(.) is
assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable.
A1 µ′(e) > 0, µ′′(e) < 0 for e ≥ 0.
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3.2 Status in the Organization
Organizations may grant recognition to their members through various formal sources of
status: wage distribution, distribution of scarce non monetary resources (such as offices,
furniture, computers, locker rooms, dining facilities...), conspicuous awards or, most com-
monly, positions in the organization’s hierarchy. In the case of hierarchies, the choice of
a status allocation is constrained by the production process (i.e., the technology). Yet
there are many instances of firms in the same industry resorting to different hierarchies
despite similar production technologies. In the auto industry Toyota has seven layers of
management between its CEO and employees on the factory floor, whereas Ford has sev-
enteen and GM has as many as twenty-two (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). At Nucor
Corporation, a steel producer, the number of layers in the executive hierarchy has been
restricted to 4 against a dozen on average for the rest of the industry (see Ghemawat,
1995). From the above examples it is apparent that organizations are somewhat able to
manipulate hierarchical differentiation to provide work incentives. In order to empha-
size the relationship between status and work incentives we abstract from the technical
role played by the hierarchy and leave much latitude to the principal in allocating status
among organization members.13
In spite of her ability to act as a social engineer, the principal still faces a constraint be-
cause status is enjoyed through interpersonal comparisons. Independently of the method
used to grant social recognition, its value is perceived in relative terms. Then the increase
in an individual’s status is always achieved at the expanse of someone else’s status. For
instance, if status is derived from a person’s position in a formal hierarchy, in order to
increase one agent’s status, it is necessary to improve her position in the hierarchy relative
to some other members who, inevitably, suffer some loss. In other words, status in orga-
nizations is a scarce resource. Formally, let s = (s1, ..., sn) denote a status allocation in a
feasibility set S ⊂ IRn+, the ith component measuring the status of agent i. The scarcity
assumption may be stated as follows.
13In the paper we consider departure from the ’minimal’ hierarchy (i.e., from the technical hierarchy).
We study whether the principal has interest in adding ranks for incentives purposes.
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A3 It is not possible to improve an agent’s status without degrading some other agent’s
status: ∀s, s′ ∈ S, if si > s′i for some i, then s′j > sj for some j.
Individuals being ex ante identical, the
feasibility set should also satisfy the following anonymity condition.
A4 If a status allocation s is feasible then any permutation of this allocation, denoted
sp, is also feasible: s ∈ S ⇒ sp ∈ S.
Finally, in order for the principal to have as much freedom as possible in fine tuning the
status allocation, the feasibility set should be connected. We impose the more stringent
restriction that it is convex.
A5 The feasibility set S is convex.
By assumption A3, the feasibility set is akin to a Pareto frontier and assumption A4
requires that this frontier be symmetric across individuals. Assumption A5 implies that
this frontier is linear which is somewhat restrictive and is meant to ease the exposition of
the results (especially in the optimization problem). Some discussion of the robustness of
our results to more general functional forms is provided in Section 6. It is straightforward
to establish that under assumptions A3-A5 a status allocations is feasible if and only if it
satisfies a linear constraint that may be written as
(F)
n∑
i=1
si − n = 0, s ∈ IRn+.
Overall status summing up to n is a normalization. Any other strictly positive constant
would lead to the same results. However n has the convenient property that, when no
status disparity is introduced, all agents have a status of 1 so that our results may easily
be contrasted with those of the classical moral hazard literature with quasi-linear agent
preferences.
Finally when an agent enters the organization, she must have a position in the hier-
archy so that, contrary to wages, status is awarded before the agent exerts effort. Thus,
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in a static context, status may not be used as a reward (see section 4). It may however
depend on past performance in a long term relationship (see section 5).
If employees are treated differently as a result of their past performance, this differ-
entiation seems legitimate. However if the principal chooses to treat new employees in
different ways the differentiation will be deemed arbitrary. In our framework, there is
no basis for a-priori legitimacy. Agents are ex-ante identical and perform identical and
independent tasks. This is clearly a simplification. In real world situations there is al-
ways some heterogeneity among workers: sex, race, age, personal history, and so on. This
heterogeneity may be the basis for a discriminatory treatment.14 In section 4, we show
that such an a-priori unequal treatment is actually undesirable for the organization. This
however is due to the employee’s inability to commit in actual work relations. To see why
this is the case, we now briefly discuss what would be the optimal incentive scheme in the
first-best situation where there is no moral hazard problem.
3.3 First Best Allocation
We first consider the benchmark case where each agent may fully commit to a contractible
effort level as well as to an unconditional participation in the organization. It is then
optimal for the principal to offer each agent to participate in a lottery where there is only
one winner who receives all of the status and who is the only employee being paid. The
main argument in the proof is that, instead of having two agents with positive status,
the joint status could be given to only one, where each of them would receive this total
status with some probability. The added status for each agent when she is paid exactly
compensates her for a lower probability of being paid. This allows for paying each agent
less often, thus lowering the expected wage bill by a factor n.15 Because of the positive
14For instance Cawley (2000) finds evidence that in the US weight lowers wages for white women. In
his study a difference in weight of two standard deviations (roughly sixty-five pounds) is associated with
a difference in wages of 7%.
15For the sake of simplicity consider the case where the individual probability to win the lottery is 1n .
The prize is swin = s, where s is a strictly positive constant (e.g. n in (F)) and wwin = ns
(
U + ψ(e∗)
)
where e∗ is the first best effort level (i.e., it is solution to ψ′(e) = µ′(e)∆q). With such a lottery
the individual expected utility is U , each agent commit to effort level e∗ and the total wage bill is
n
s
(
U + ψ(e∗)
)
. In comparison when si = sn ∀i (i.e., the classical principal-agent model), the individual
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cross-effects between status and income, it is optimal to concentrate status and monetary
rewards on one individual.
One might think that the optimality of a lottery depends on income risk neutrality or
on the linearity of the feasibility constraint. It turns out that the result is quite robust. A
lottery is still optimal if, utility is linear in one argument and either the agent is risk averse
regarding income, or utility is strictly concave in status (which is equivalent to introducing
an additively separable quasi-convex feasibility constraint for status).16 Becker, Murphy
and Werning (2000) obtain related results while studying the evolution of inequalities
when individuals care both about income and status and the two are complements. They
show that individuals are willing to participate in lotteries even though they have a
diminishing marginal utility of income. As is the case here, complementarity between
consumption and status implies that individuals are willing to take gambles in which
winners get to consume more, along with a higher status.17
Actual work relations allow for much less commitment on the part of the agent than
what was postulated here. Subsequent sections investigate the implications of our model
in more realistic settings.
4 The Cost of Status Manipulation
Real world work relations typically involve a moral hazard problem since effort levels are
not perfectly verifiable. Furthermore, the ability of an agent to commit is limited by work
legislation which usually forbids clauses that would prevent her from quitting at any time.
For both these reasons, the first-best solutions may not be implemented: losing agents
would either not participate or, if they did participate, they would exert no effort. In
this section we reconsider the static problem and show that moral hazard and the lack
wage is wi = ns
(
U + ψ(e∗)
)
. The total wage bill is n
2
s
(
U + ψ(e∗)
)
.
16See section 6 for related arguments.
17Focusing on the evolution of inequality they do not consider moral hazard problem. There is no
effort in their setting. They get the nice result that starting from different distribution of wealth, the
society ends up with an unique unequal distribution. They conclude that there is an incompressible level
of inequality if people care about social status.
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of commitment on the part of agents force the principal into choosing a solution which
drastically differs from the first-best.
The moral hazard problem and the agent’s lack of commitment translate into in-
centive compatibility constraints and interim participation constraints respectively. The
information structure of a static relationship is as follows:
stage 1 : the principal offers contracts which specify for each agent status and monetary
rewards;
stage 2: agents choose whether or not to participate;
stage 3: interim information (the draw of a lottery, if any) is revealed and agents
choose whether to quit or not;
stage 4: agents chose their effort levels;
stage 5: outputs are observed and payments are made.
The new constraints are a consequence of stages 3 and 4. The interim stage 3 may
seem unnatural in this context and is solely introduced for the sake of comparability with
the first-best solution. As we already pointed out, the lottery involved in the first-best
clearly violates both the interim participation constraints of stage 3 and the incentive
compatibility constraints of stage 4.18
At stage 5, payments may depend on output. Let wi be agent i’s fixed salary and
∆wi be agent i’s bonus in case of a high performance (i.e., wi + ∆wi and wi are agent i’s
wages associated to outputs q and q respectively). Worker i chooses her effort so as to
maximize:
EUi =
(
µ(ei)∆wi + wi
)
si − ψ(ei).(2)
Under assumptions A1 and A2, the agent’s utility is strictly concave in effort and therefore
has a unique maximum point. Agent i’s optimal effort, e∗(si∆wi), solves the following
18It is a-priori less apparent whether the added constraints rule out lotteries all together. Proposition
2 shows that they do.
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first order condition,
ψ′(e∗(si∆wi))
µ′(e∗(si∆wi))
= si∆wi.(3)
Standard comparative statics shows that, from the concavity of µ and the convexity of ψ,
e∗ is increasing in si∆wi. It is independent of wi due to income risk neutrality.
Taking into account additional constraints, the principal’s program may be written as
maxE
n∑
i=1
µ(ei)(∆q −∆wi)− wi + q
subject to
n∑
i=1
si = n, with probability 1,
si[µ(ei)∆wi + wi]− ψ(ei)] ≥ U ∀ i = 1, ..., n, with probability 1,
ei = e
∗(si∆wi) ∀ i = 1, ..., n with probability 1.
Note that the ex-ante participation constraints are dropped since they are implied by the
interim participation constraint.
The following proposition states three conditions that should hold in an optimal al-
location and which, in short, say that a higher status goes hand-in-hand with a higher
income.
Proposition 1 (status/income complementarity) In an optimal solution, the three
following conditions must hold with probability 1.
(i) ∆wi ≤ ∆q ∀i = 1, ..., n.
(ii) ∆wi = ∆q or wi = 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n.
(iii) Suppose e∗ is concave. Then, si < sj if and only if wi = wj = 0 and ∆wi < ∆wj,
or wi < wj.
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The proof is in the appendix. Part (i) is the standard result that there is no point
for the principal in giving more than full incentives. Part (ii) is also quite standard;
19Sufficient conditions for e∗ to be concave are that µ′′′ < 0 and ψ′′′ > 0.
16
given that the agent is risk neutral, the principal abstains from giving full incentives only
when she is restricted in the choice of the low performance wage. The novel insight from
Proposition 1 is in part (iii) which states that agents with differing status, either receive
different low performance wages (the higher status agent being better paid) or receive
different incentives (the larger high performance reward going to the higher status agent).
That is, different status levels imply an unequal treatment in monetary as well as symbolic
rewards. This logic is exploited fully in the first best solution, where the whole status and
money is concentrated on one agent. However, as the next proposition shows, the lack of
commitment on the agents’ part, makes unequal treatment among agents suboptimal.
Proposition 2 (symbolic egalitarianism) To maximize instantaneous profit it is op-
timal to give identical agents identical contracts (same status, same monetary scheme).
Appendix 2 provides a proof of Proposition 2 under some technical conditions on ψ
and µ.20 To give some intuition for this result, consider the case where at least one
agent, i, receives a strictly positive low performance wage. Then it is easy to show, using
Proposition 1, that if some other agent’s status differs from that of agent i, profit may
be increased. To see this, note that (iii) in Proposition 1 implies that the agent with the
larger status necessarily has a strictly larger expected utility (which is therefore strictly
above U) and a weakly larger low performance wage. The larger low performance wage
must be strictly positive since it is at least as large as that of agent i. Hence the low
performance wage of the agent with a larger status may be decreased without violating
her individual rationality constraint so that profit would increase.21
The situation where the principal chooses to give strictly positive low performance
wages occurs when U is large enough, namely when
U > µ(e∗(∆q))∆q − ψ(e∗(∆q)).(4)
This lower bound is obtained as follows. First note that the status of the agent getting the
worst treatment may not exceed 1. Since, from (i) in Proposition 1, it is not optimal to
20From the argument that follows, those technical conditions are only needed in the case where U is
low enough so that the lower bound constraint for the wage is binding.
21Note that because of risk neutrality, effort is unaffected by a change in the low performance wage.
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give monetary incentives exceeding ∆q, if (4) holds, her individual rationality constraint
requires that she receives a strictly positive low performance wage. All agents must
therefore have an equal status of 1. Then (ii) in Proposition 1 prescribes that all agents
should receive full incentive, thus being rewarded ∆q for a high performance. This is not
surprising since agents are risk neutral regarding money and the principal is, in this case,
not constrained by a lower bound on monetary transfers. The case where U is low which
is more complex, is analyzed in the appendix.
Proposition 2 is the first formalization with the tools of economists of the equity the-
ory in social psychology according to which it is harmful to introduce differences among
workers performing identical tasks (see Adams, 1965). A major theme in human resource
management is that symbolic differentiation among workers is an obstacle to communi-
cation, cooperation, and commitment for those who are in lower positions. Pfeffer (1994)
argues that “symbolic egalitarianism” is a key feature of human resource management
in successful companies. He points to such examples as the car manufacturer NUMMI,
where the executive dining room has been eliminated, or the contract manufacturer Se-
lectron whose CEO has no private office. The well documented success story of Nucor
Corporation is another striking illustration (see Ghemawat, 1995). At Nucor, external
signs of hierarchical differences are systematically de-emphasized (no personal secretary,
common parking lot, everybody flying economy class, and so on). Nucor relies on direct
monetary rewards to provide work incentive. The average Nucor salary is comparable
to competitors’ average salary, but the structure differs (it has more bonus and less fix).
Yet the turn-over rate is low. Obviously Nucor has succeeded in stimulating individual
involvement in the firm’s operation by its original work management.
By virtue of Proposition 2 symbolic differentiation is sub-optimal. The benefit made
on those with improved status does not compensated for the loss made on those whose
status is deteriorated. According to this egalitarian logic, in a short term
relationship the principal chooses to rely on direct monetary incentives and avoids
hierarchical differences. Workers’ incentives stem solely from the variable part of their pay,
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as recommended by standard micro-economics. This result is consistent with empirical
evidences on short term contracts (e.g., for temporary workers). In a once and for all
relationship only technological constraints motivate the introduction of a hierarchy. The
next sections show that this conclusion is no more valid if the work relation is long term.
5 Overlapping Generations in the Organization
Work relationships between individuals and organizations are in general medium to long
term.22 As workers stay longer than one period within the organization, the principal has
more instruments to provide them with work incentives than in the previous section. In-
deed she can replicate the static contract, but can also propose an intertemporal incentive
scheme that links future rewards to past performances.
We study this problem within an overlapping generations setup with an infinite hori-
zon. At each date, the organization is comprised of two “generations”: the “young”
(juniors) who enter the organization in the current period and the “old” (seniors) who
joined the organization in the previous period and will not be around in the next one.
Hence each cohort only stays two periods. Lotteries are ruled out and we assume that
the principal is able to commit. Finally we restrict the analysis to equitable contracts: all
young agents at period t are offered the same two period contract. Thus identical agents
(i.e. with identical re´sume´s) receive an identical treatment. Proposition 2 suggests that
this restriction is reasonable. Moreover
The timing for a cohort joining the organization at date t is as follows.
date t:
stage 1, the new cohort of workers is offered contracts that include a beginning status
level, a monetary incentive scheme and a promotion system (future status and monetary
scheme depending on past performance);
stage 2, agents choose whether or not to participate;
22For more on this see Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
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stage 3, workers choose an effort level based on their current monetary incentives and
status as well as their promotion prospects;
stage 4, outputs are observed, transfers and promotions occur;
date t+ 1:
stage 5, agents choose whether to stay or to leave;
stage 6, workers choose an effort level according to their current monetary incentive and
status (which may depend on whether they have been successful in the first period or
not);
stage 7, outputs are observed, transfers occur, workers retire.
Note that stage 5 implies that, as is the case in actual work contracts, an agent may
not commit for two periods. An individual rationality constraint for old workers must
therefore be included.
Each worker’s intertemporal utility is assumed to be additively separable with a dis-
count factor of δ < 1. The expected utility of an old worker exerting an effort ept and
whose past performance has been p ∈ {l, h} (l is for “low” and h is for “high”) is that of
the static model (see equation 2):
EUpt = [µ(ept)∆wpt + wpt]spt − ψ(ept).
Let ∆Ut = EUht−EUlt. A young worker’s expected intertemporal utility if her effort
level is e1t is
EU1t = s1t[µ(e1t)∆w1t + w1t]− ψ(e1t) + δ[µ(e1t)∆Ut+1 + EUl(t+1)].
The individual rationality constraints are:
(IR’) EUpt ≥ U , p ∈ {h, l} and EU1t ≥ (1 + δ)U.
Let e∗ be implicitly defined by equation (3). It is easy to check that the incentive
compatibility constraints for the young and for the old may be written as follows.
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(IC’) e1t = e
∗(s1t∆w1t + δ∆Ut+1) and ept = e∗(spt∆wpt) p ∈ {h, l}.
The population is assumed to be large so that it may be represented by a continuum
with a measure normalized to 2. Then, at each period, the proportion of old who have
been successful when young, denoted γt, is equal to the probability µ(e1,t−1) that, in the
previous period, a young agent had a high performance. The feasibility constraint on
status allocation is:
(F’) s1t + γtsht + (1− γt)slt = 2 with γt = µ(e1,t−1).
Let us denote c1t = (s1t, w1t,∆w1t) the contract of a young worker at date t, and
cpt = (spt, wpt,∆wpt) the contract of an old at date t with performance p ∈ {h, l} at date
t− 1. As in the static model the principal faces three types of constraints at each period:
(F’), (IR’), (IC’). She must pick a sequence of contract combinations < (c1t, cht, clt) >
that maximizes intertemporal profit subject to those constraints. The principal has the
same discount factor as workers, δ < 1, so that there is no exogenous bias against, or in
favor, of delayed monetary rewards. Her intertemporal profit may be written as:
+∞∑
t=0
δtEΠt =
+∞∑
t=0
δt
{
µ(e1t)(∆q −∆w1t)− w1t + γt
[
µ(eht)(∆q −∆wht)− wht
]
(5)
+(1− γt)
[
µ(elt)(∆q −∆wlt)− wlt
]
+ 2q
}
.
Initial conditions, γ0, ch0 and cl0, are exogenously given. Finally we define a steady state
to be a situation in which (c1t, cht, clt) is independent of time (i.e. all generations are
offered the same intertemporal contract).
6 Incentives and Promotions
One well known puzzle in the literature on internal labor markets (ILM) is the extensive
use of promotions as a means of providing incentives.23 It is widely accepted that, although
23According to Doeringer and Piore (1971) the main features of an internal labor market are: long term
employment relationships, limited port of entry for hiring, career paths within the firm and promotion
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promotions have an obvious role as a screening device, they are, to a large extent, used
as a reward for good past performances. As Milgrom and Roberts (1992, Chapter 11)
note, it is not necessarily the case that the best person in a top position is the one who
performed the best at lower levels. This may result in a conflict between the two roles
of promotions: incentives and screening. To solve this conflict, companies such as 3M
or IBM have created separate career ladders for scientists and engineers so that they
may be promoted without having to go into management. Similarly, faculty members in
universities, or physicians in hospital are generally promoted without changing job.
Even when there is no conflict between incentive goals and screening goals, the exten-
sive use of promotions for incentive purposes remains puzzling. Direct monetary transfers
allow for a better fine tuning of the incentive scheme contrary to promotions which are
discrete and rare. One explanation for the use of discrete incentive schemes is that it
is not always possible to assess absolute performance whereas relative performances are
somewhat easier to establish. Then promotions may be viewed as a prize in a tournament
between employees as in Lazear and Rosen (1981). Our analysis suggests that because of
the trophee value of winning a prize, tournaments are appropriate even if absolute perfor-
mance may be observed. Management practices directed at sales force employees, whose
output is easily observed, are consistent with this result.24 Then viewing promotions and
tournaments as an instance of differentiation among workers yields valuable insights into
their role in work incentives; They help fulfilling individuals’ need for recognition.
While the static approach emphasized the costs of symbolic differentiation, the present
dynamic setting highlights its benefits as part of an intertemporal incentive scheme. In
view of the various constraints which pertain to the dynamic profit optimization problem,
one would expect that the exact nature of the solution depends very much on which of
these constraints are binding. Although this is true to some extent, the results in the next
from within.
24Along with the “Top E´lite Club”, AGF has created the “Club Pro” designed to encourage steady
high performances. In order to join, a sales person must meet some prespecified goals (they are absolute,
not relative). It takes three years of high performance to join, and only one year to join back for a former
member who had been dropped after a bad year. The “Club Pro” thus represents a persistent change in
status. A high past performance is formally acknowledged as in a promotion system.
22
proposition are quite general.
Proposition 3 (incentives through promotion) In a steady state of a profit maxi-
mizing solution we have
s1 = w1 = ∆w1 = 0,(6)
sh > sl.(7)
wh ≥ wl and ∆wh ≥ ∆wl,(8)
where at least one of the inequalities in (8) is strict.
The above Proposition, which is proved in the appendix, provides a crisp charac-
terization of the optimal intertemporal incentive scheme. It is optimal to endow young
agents with the lowest possible status level while providing them with no direct monetary
incentive.25
Junior workers earn the same salary independently of their performances. They are
induced to exert effort by the prospect of a future promotion. That is, pay is attached
to job and earnings profiles become individual specific only as careers unfold. When old,
an agent’s status and monetary incentive scheme depend on her past performance. As in
the static context, it is optimal to associate a higher wage to a higher status. However,
in contrast with the egalitarian solution of Proposition 2, it is optimal to introduce some
differentiation between generations and among old agents. A higher past performance
induces a higher status as well as higher monetary compensations. This solution allows
for taking advantage of positive cross effects between status and income by concentrating
benefits in both dimensions on one state of nature. This is reminiscent of the first-best
solution in the static problem where the whole status and wage are concentrated on one
individual.
An important result in the literature on repeated moral hazard is that the optimal
long term incentive contract should involve some memory: the type of incentives currently
25As explained earlier utility could easily be rewritten to allow for non zero lower bounds (e.g.,
u(w, s, e) = (w + 1)(s+ 1)− ψ(e)). The important point is that there are such lower bounds.
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given to an agent depends on her past performance (see for instance Rogerson, 1985, and
Chiappori et al., 1994). The idea is that, if agents are risk averse, it is optimal to spread
over time the effect of income shocks resulting from good or bad performances; this is the
need for consumption smoothing emphasized by Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988). The
need for consumption smoothing implies that it is not optimal to delay all rewards and
penalties as is done in actual promotion systems and in accordance with the prescriptions
of Proposition 3. An obvious difference between the model of this paper and the standard
repeated moral hazard framework is the agents’ attitude towards risk on income. Here
agents are taken to be risk neutral while they are usually assumed to be risk averse. With
risk neutral agents in the standard model (where all have equal status), the principal is
indifferent as to when the young should receive monetary rewards as long as all parties
discount the future at the same rate and their limited liability constraint is not binding.
Then postponing all rewards as is done in Proposition 3 is one solution, but not the only
one.
We now briefly explore the robustness of our results to the introduction of some income
risk aversion in the agents’ preferences. It turns out that in order to investigate this point,
it is fruitful to concurrently discuss the robustness of the results to a change in the status
technology. In the model considered here, the status constraint is linear and utility is
linear in status. This may loosely be interpreted in saying that there are constant returns
to concentrating status on one group of individuals. It might be expected that, if those
returns were sufficiently decreasing, the result that the young should have a minimal status
would be upset. There are two possible options for making returns to concentrating status
decreasing: either the
left-hand side of the status feasibility constraint could be made strictly quasiconvex
or utility could be made strictly concave in status. The second route is followed in the
argument below.
Let us rewrite instantaneous utility as
u(w, s, e) = g(s)h(w)− ψ(e), s ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, e ≥ 0,
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where h and g are concave functions satisfying h(0) = g(0) = 0.
In Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 3, it is shown that if h and g are linear, then a
steady state in which the young have positive status cannot be optimal since it is possible
to obtain the same effort levels and the same intertemporal utility level while increasing
the utility of the old and paying a lower wage bill. The following proposition states that
this argument may be generalized to situations where either h or g is strictly concave.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the agent’s instantaneous utility is linear in income (h lin-
ear) or linear in status (g linear) while the discount rate is small enough. Then in any
steady state of an optimal solution we have s1 = w1 = ∆w1 = 0.
The proposition is proved in the appendix. It shows that the result that the young
should receive a minimal status is upheld when either income risk aversion is introduced
or utility is strictly concave in status. Because earnings and status are complement,
individuals are willing to take gambles (in exchange for their effort while young) in which
winners receive both a higher income and a higher status (for related results with income
risk aversion see Becker, Murphy and Werning, 2000).
7 Job tenure and career profiles
Combining Propositions 2 and 3 our results indicate that an organization will choose to
resort to symbolic differentiation for incentive purpose only when it can set up an internal
labor market. More specifically, the predictions of the model are as follows. In a long
term relationship rewards for a high performance are delayed in time and a pay increase is
associated with a change in status which usually is achieved by a move up in the hierarchy.
Furthermore, the use of direct monetary incentives is limited and wages are to a large
extent attached to jobs, so that promotions are the main source of incentives. Differences
in productivity are then reflected in wages only for senior employees. In contrast, if
commitment is not possible, no symbolic differentiation is introduced. Incentives are
provided through direct monetary rewards. The hierarchy is flatter and pay is no longer
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attached to jobs. Employees with different productivities are paid different wages early on.
The feasibility of an internal labor market hinges on the employees’ expected tenure within
the organization which conditions the organization’s ability to commit. A comparison of
work relations in the United States and in Japan illustrates the two situations of strong
and weak commitment.
According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics the average person in the US holds
9.2 jobs from age 18 to age 34. More than half of these jobs are held between the ages
of 18 and 24 (Department of Labor 2000). This does not mean that there is no internal
labor market in the US.26 However they tend to begin late in the career (i.e., after age
35). As Brown et al. (1997) note ”retention rates are bifurcated for male workers in
the US. American junior workers have only a 25 percent to 35 percent chance of being
with the same employers five years hence, while workers with five to ten years’ experience
have 90 percent retention rates in the utilities, transportation, and service industries
and 60 percent to 70 percent retention rates in government, finance, manufacturing, and
agriculture (Nakata, 1990).” As Farber (1999) shows, most new jobs in the US end early,
and the probability of a job ending declines with tenure. In contrast in Japan labor
mobility is low for young core workers. For instance 3/4 of Japanese engineers will have
only one employer during their entire career (Jacobs and Herbig, 1998). Hashimoto and
Raisian (1985), using data from the 1960s and 1970s, indicate that among male workers
holding a job for at least 5 years when they are 20-24 years old, 65% retain that job
15 years later in Japan against 30% in the United-States. These differences have been
remarkably stable since the early 1970s.27
The present analysis then predicts that, while young, Japanese workers receive rela-
tively low wages, independently of their education level. Differentiation comes later in
the career so that the earnings profile is increasing with seniority at an increasing
rate. That is, the earnings profile is roughly upwards sloping and convex. In contrast in
26Internal labor markets do exist in the US, and, contrary to what is often believed, they are quite
stable (see Groshen and Levine, 1998).
27For updated data see Brown et al 1997 pp 31.
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the US young workers who are very mobile do not accept delayed rewards. Their earnings
profiles should be relatively steeper at young ages (i.e., under 35), and flatter later (not
necessarily upwards sloping). Earnings, which better reflect workers’ productivity, should
also be more differentiated across education levels. This implies that the disparity in
earnings is higher for young workers in the US than in Japan.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics real earnings of individuals in the US
increase more rapidly at young ages than at older ages. From the ages of 18 to 24, real
hourly earnings grow on average by 6.6 percent per year. This growth rate falls to 4
percent between age 25 and age 29 and then to 2.4 percent between age 30 and age
34 (US Department of Labor 2000).28 In contrast in Japan young core workers receive
undifferentiated treatment. “White-collar and blue-collar pay tables are integrated into a
single table that erases distinctions between the two categories. There is also no major gap
between production workers and craft workers. New workers are placed at the bottom
of the ability rank table and given simple assignments.” (Brown et al., 1997 pp 105).
Differentiation appears with seniority so that a pay raise is coupled with a change in
status. ”University graduates may reach management in 10 years, typically by the time
they reach ages 35 to 40. High school graduates may reach management in twenty-two
years, and most have reached a management grade by age 50. Much of the career-based
pay increases take place only when, and if, workers are promoted to managerial positions
that are not in the union, generally after age 35.” (Brown et al., 1997 pp 111).
This implies that for young workers (i.e., below age 30-35) the level of earnings and
the variance of earning are low. Figures 2 and 3 which are borrowed from Brown et al.
(1997) pp. 117 and 118 provide a striking illustration of the results discussed above.
[Figures 2 and 3]
Figure 2 depicts earnings by age and education in the automobile industry and in the
electrical industry in Japan and in the US; Figure 3 gives earnings profiles by age and
28Young American workers who face flat tenure-earnings profile change job to increase their earnings.
For instance Topel and Ward (1992) found considerable returns to between-job mobility in a study of
white male high school graduates.
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education on a national-level basis. In Japan differentiation in earnings comes after age
35 and the earnings gap between different type of workers is widening with age.29 In
contrast in the US earnings which increase (sharply for educated workers) in the junior
years but not necessarily afterwards, are differentiated early. The earnings gap between
educated and non educated workers widens until age 35-39 and then stabilizes. In the US
the earnings profile is roughly increasing and concave; in Japan it is increasing and convex.
Since the industries studied are standardized the difference in earnings profile cannot be
explained by technological differences. They reflect different management practices.
Our theoretical analysis predicts that internal labor markets are a superior mode of
work organization. The theoretical prediction is somewhat corroborated by a comparison
of per worker growth rates of GDP in the US and in Japan. Over the period from 1979
to 1990, its annual average has been 2.9 percent in Japan against 1 percent in the US
(OECD 1992). It is generally accepted that the distinctive human resource management
of Japanese firms provided an important source of increased efficiency and growth. If this
is the case one may wonder why firms in the US do not resort to them more systematically.
There is no obvious answer to this question. There are arguably cultural differences in
work related value orientations that affect the labor market organisation.30 For instance
US workers are supposedly more individualistic and more concerned with annual income
than with long-term employment
since money income, rather than company affiliation, is important in marking success.
Furthermore, dismissal regulation is more stringent in Japan and firms use alternatives to
layoffs for employment adjustment of core workers. Houseman (1997) shows that countries
with a strict dismissal regulation have longer job tenures. Finally to organize an internal
labor market, firms need not only to commit to keep employees, but also to be large
enough or growing to propose stimulating career paths. In recession phases this might
not be possible. Recently in Japan there has been a growing number of middle-aged
29At an aggregate level, earnings profile in Japan increases with age at an increasing rate until 55.
After that age companies encourage workers to retire.
30Hofstede (1980) identified four dimensions along which dominant patterns of culture can be ordered:
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity. Later he added long-term orientation.
Japan scores higher than the US on all dimensions except for individualism.
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employees, referred to as ”marginal employees” (genkai shain), who are on payroll but
are unemployed. This
situation is not stable because firms in recessions cannot afford to pay high wages to
redundant employees. Moreover junior employees will not work very hard to later become
the “bulge generation”, the “overpaid”, or the “window gazers”. This is opposed to the
logic of grouping rewards in status and income later in the career.
The Japanese system of life time employment, and more generally promotion systems,
are not appropriate for unstable economic environment. When flexibility matters so that
commitment is not possible there is no benefit in creating hierarchical structure for in-
centives purpose. Firms should rely on direct monetary incentives. In recent years there
has been a significant move towards delayering in industrial countries. For instance the
study by Bauer and Bender (2001) on a representative German employer-employee data
set reveals that between 1993 and 1995 50.73% of the 251 firms sampled went through a
reduction in hierarchy levels. Similarly it has been noted that during the 1980s, many US
companies have engaged in reducing the number of employment levels. For instance, Gen-
eral Electric (chemical division) cut the number of pay grades from 22 to 5.31 According
to our analysis, this evolution may be the result of a weakening employer’s commitment
which could be explained by an anticipated increase in the job loss rate. Indeed there
have been evidences of such an increase during the 1990s (see for instance Farber, 1997).
8 Conclusion.
We have argued that social recognition has a major role in the work place and we have
shown that taking this role into account may enhance our understanding of actual man-
agement practices. Social aspects are all the more significant that much of labor relations
take place outside the market. Our analysis relies on the following two premises: recogni-
tion and income are complements and recognition is scarce because it is valued in relative
terms. Our main findings are that, while it is costly to introduce differentiation between
31See Gerhart and Milkovich (1992).
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identical coworkers in a static environment, such a differentiation may prove to be quite
a powerful incentive device in a dynamic setting. Stylised facts are consistent with our
theory. In particular the grouping of rewards implies that those who are promoted are
paid above their marginal productivity. This helps to explain why the wage increase asso-
ciated with a promotion is oftentimes out of proportion with any reasonable guess on the
increase in marginal productivity resulting from switching to a job higher in the firm’s
hierarchy (Lazear 1991).32
This paper focuses on one particular aspect of the incentive role of promotions. There
are of course other theoretical explanations. In particular a stylised fact that received
much attention in the economic literature is the positive relationship between tenure and
pay. The use of large prizes only attributed at specific times in a career is often interpreted
as an attempt by firms to improve employee attachment (see for instance Becker, 1962,
Salop and Salop, 1976 or Lazear, 1979). Lazear (1979) proposes an appealing explanation
which is based on firm-specific capital. He shows that firms that want to invest in specific
capital in their workers offer a back-loaded compensation structure to retain them. Farber
(1999) tries to explain the high return to tenure by testing firm-specific human capital
theories. He concludes that “the capital that accrues with tenure has a strong industry-
specific rather than firm-specific component. To the extent that this is the case, it is
harder to argue that the accrual of firm-specific capital is what drives the decline in the
probability of job change with tenure”. This empirical result shows that
firm-specific investment in human capital cannot be the sole determinant of the design
of promotion systems and hierarchies. It is also affected by the need to honor deserving
employees and to meet functional goals such as production efficiency or screening.
Taking a broader perspective, the present paper shows that an analysis of incentive
32In Auriol and Renault (2001) we investigate the implications of Proposition 3 for the specific shape of
the optimal incentive hierarchy assuming that µ(e) = min{e, 1} and ψ(e) = A e22 . We find that the harder
it is for an employee to improve performance through effort (i.e., the larger A), the more pyramid-like
is the incentive hierarchy. Indeed when A is very large success is rare; it is extremely prestigious to get
promoted and the associated pay raise is huge (it diverges in the limit). On the other hand if a high
performance is easily achieved a seniority based promotion system may be optimal (i.e., everybody is
successful and is promoted).
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packages that would only focus on monetary incentives would overlook manay important
issues in human resources management. Yet, taking a full account of all relevant aspects
and achieving a proper asesment of the costs and benefits of differentiation may prove to
be a difficult task. For instance some authors have stressed that ill defined recognition
systems lead to mental health disorders for employees. Hood (2002) notes “In North
America, mental health problems cost US$80 billion/year, while stress and mental health
disorders increased about 200% over the five years up to and including the year 2000.”33
Accounting for such considerations is presumably not a simple challenge.
33According to the author the top 5 sources of workplace stress are: 1) the feeling of not contributing and
lacking control, 2) lack of two way communication up and down, 3) being unappreciated, 4) inconsistent
performance management processes, 5) career and job ambiguity.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof of the first two conditions is straightforward. First note that for a given
status level si total surplus is a strictly concave function of effort which reaches a maximum
at e∗(si∆q). Thus if ∆wi > ∆q, total surplus may be increased by decreasing ∆wi, while
keeping the agents’ utility unchanged by increasing wi. This clearly increases profit. By
a symmetric argument, if ∆wi < ∆q and wi > 0, profit could be increased by increasing
∆wi and decreasing wi.
To prove that condition (iii) must hold first note that
(wj,∆wj) = (0, 0)⇔ sj = 0.
Thus if sj = 0 the result clearly holds. The remainder of the proof deals with the case
where si > sj > 0.
It is useful to define
g(w,∆w, s) =
µ(e∗(s∆w))∆w + w
s
.
Step 1: If si > sj > 0, and g(wi,∆wi, si) = g(wj,∆wj, sj) then condition (iii) must hold.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the requirement that g be constant ensures
the existence of a differentiable function (w(s),∆w(s)) with partial derivatives
∂w
∂s
(s) =
−(∂g/∂s)(w,∆w, s)
(∂g/∂w)(w,∆w, s)
,
∂∆w
∂s
(s) =
−(∂g/∂s)(w,∆w, s)
(∂g/∂∆w)(w,∆w, s)
.
Since the partial derivatives of g with respect to w and ∆w are clearly strictly pos-
itive, the above partials will be strictly positive as long as (∂g/∂s)(w,∆w, s) < 0, or
[−∆wµ(e∗(∆ws))−w+∆w2e∗′(∆ws)µ′(e∗(∆ws)) < 0.] Since (w,∆w) 6= (0, 0), if ∆w = 0
the above condition clearly holds. If ∆w > 0, it holds under the sufficient condition that
[µ(e∗(∆ws)) − ∆we∗′(∆ws)µ′(e∗(∆ws)) > 0. ] Since µ(e∗(0)) = 0 the above condition
holds as long as µ ◦ e∗ is concave, which in turn is true if e∗ is concave.
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Step 2. If si > sj > 0, g(wi,∆wi, si) = g(wj,∆wj, sj).
Since all agent have strictly positive status, it is always possible, for any pair of agents,
to increase the status of one while reducing that of the other one by the same amount.
Consider now what would happen if this is done while keeping both agent’s effort level
and utility constant. This amounts to keeping the sum si + sj and the products, sk∆wk,
and skwk, k = i.j, constant. These requirements may be written out as ∆wk = f1(sk),
wk = f2(sk) and sj = f3(si), where f1, f2 and f3 are three differentiable functions with
derivatives respectively defined by f ′1(si) = −∆wisi , f ′2(si) = −
wi
si
and f ′3(si) = −1. Then
the derivative of profit with respect to si, given that sj changes by the same amount with
an opposite sign and that efforts and utilities remain unchanged is given by
−µ(e∗(si∆wi))f ′1(si)− f ′2(si)− f ′3(si)[µ(e∗(sj∆wj))f ′1(sj) + f ′2(sj)].
If this derivative was non zero, it would be profitable to transfer status from one agent
to the other. Now the requirement that this derivative is zero yields the result.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2.
First we show that if status differs across agents then wi = 0 for all i.
Suppose not. Then for some agent i, wi > 0. Then from Lemma 2(ii), ∆wi = ∆q.
Now suppose that for some agent j, sj > si. Then by Lemma 2(ii) and 2(iii) ∆wj = ∆q
and wj > wi. Then agent j’s expected utility Uj is larger than agent i
′s. Since individual
rationality must hold for agent i, Uj > 0. Then profit could be increased by decreasing
wj. If on the other hand, sj < si for some j, a similar argument shows that it is possible
to increase profit by decreasing wi.
Now if wi = 0 and (IR) is binding, then ∆wi must be larger if status is lower. Then,
from Lemma 2(iii), all agents in that situation must have the same status.
Now consider agents for whom wi = 0 and (IR) does not bind. Setting the first
derivative of expected profit with respect to ∆wi to 0 we find that the optimal solution
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must satisfy
sie
∗′(si∆w∗(si))µ′(e∗(si∆w∗(si)))(∆q −∆w∗(si))− (e∗(si∆w∗(si))) = 0.
Standard comparative statics shows that
si∆w
∗′(si) = −∆w∗ + ∆qe
∗′µ′(e∗)
−si(∆q −∆w)[e∗′′µ′(e∗) + [e∗′]2µ′′(e∗)] + 2e∗′µ′(e∗)
Some computations show that ∆w∗′(si) ≤ 0, if and only if
−∆w∗si[e∗′′µ′(e∗) + [e∗′]2µ′′(e∗)] ≥ e∗′µ′(e∗)∆q − 2∆w
∗
∆q −∆w∗ .
A sufficient condition for the above inequality is that the derivative of xe∗′(x)µ′(e∗(x))
with respect to x should be non positive. Using the first order conditions for optimal
effort, this derivative should be equal to that of e∗′(x)ψ′(e∗(x)) which is non positive if
µ′′′ < 0, ψ′′′ > 0 and
ψ′′(e)
ψ′(e)
≤ −2µ
′′(e)
µ′(e)
.
for all e.
Then, ∆w∗ is decreasing in si and, from Lemma 2(iii), all agents with a zero low
performance wage with (IR) not binding must have identical status.
Finally suppose that there are two agents i and j with wi = wj = 0 and such that
(IR) is binding for i only. Then, from Lemma 2(iii), this is possible only if si < sj.
Thus ∆w∗(si) > ∆w∗(sj). Yet, since (IR) is binding for agent i, she must receive a wage
differential even higher than ∆w∗(si) and this contradicts Lemma 2(iii)
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider a steady state. Then there exists (c1, cl, ch) such that (c1t, clt, cht) = (c1, cl, ch)
for all t. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1. c1 = (0, 0, 0).
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If s1 = 0, then it is clearly optimal to set w1 = ∆w1 = 0. Thus proving the result
amounts to showing that s1 = 0. Suppose to the contrary that s1 > 0. At some date t the
principal may switch to
c
′
1 = (0, 0, 0), c
′
h = (sh + s1,
δshwh + s1(w1 + ∆w1)
δ(sh + s1)
,
sh∆wh
sh + s1
),
c
′
l = (sl + s1,
δslwl + s1w1
δ(sl + s1)
,
sl∆wl
sl + s1
).
It is readily verified that if each generation from t on is offered these contracts, the
young’s expected intertemporal utility is maintained while the old’s intertemporal utility
is increased. Furthermore, all effort levels are maintained. On the other hand, the in-
tertemporal wage bill from each generation is clearly lower. Hence intertemporal profit
has increased. It follows that a steady state with s1 > 0 cannot be part of an optimal
solution.
Step 2: If Uh > Ul, then (7) and (8) must hold.
First note that the arguments used to prove Proposition 1 may be applied to the
old population at each period so that the two propositions, (7) and (8), are equivalent.
Furthermore, it is obvious that if Uh > Ul, we cannot have sl ≥ sh, since it would imply
that high and low performance wages for type l old workers should be at least as high as
those of type h old workers.
Step 3: Uh > Ul.
Let us first show that a steady state in which the young’s effort is zero cannot be part
of an optimal solution. In such a steady state, at each date, only the old exert effort.
Now suppose that at some date t, the principal commits to giving only half of the status
to the old at date t+ 1. Then she is in a position to implement the egalitarian solution of
Proposition 1 which is optimal in the static problem. Since the solution in which only the
old exert effort is also feasible in the static problem, it yields a strictly lower per period
profit. Thus the young’s effort must be strictly positive in the steady state of an optimal
solution.
Since the young exert effort in spite of a zero status, we must have Uh > Ul.
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Appendix 4: Proof of proposition 4.
Consider a steady state. An agent may face four possible states of nature.
For one such state of nature, ω, let s1(ω) and w1(ω) denote the agent’s status and
wage when young and, s2(ω) and w2(ω) denote the agent’s status and wage when old, Let
v(ω) = g(s1(ω))h(w1(ω)) + δg(s2(ω))h(w2(ω)). In order to ease notation, the reference to
the state ω is dropped in the remainder of the proof. Now suppose that s1 > 0. If the
principal switches to a solution (s′1, w
′
1, s
′
2, w
′
2), with s
′
1 = w
′
1 = 0 and s
′
2 = s1 + s2, v is
unchanged as long as
h(w′2) =
g(s1)h(w1) + δg(s2)h(w2)
δg(s1 + s2)
.(9)
It is readily verified that if this is done for all states of nature, effort levels and intertem-
poral expected utility are unchanged while the agent’s utility when old increases.
First suppose that the agent is risk neutral regarding income, so that h(w) = w. Then
(9) becomes [w′2 =
g(s1)w1+δg(s2)w2
δg(s1+s2)
.] Since g is strictly increasing, the discounted wage bill
δw′2 is lower than w1 + δw2. Thus the principal may obtain the same effort levels while
paying the agents less.
Now suppose that agents are risk averse but utility is linear in status (i.e. h is linear
and g is strictly concave). Then (9) reads
h(w′2) =
s1h(w1) + δs2h(w2)
δ(s1 + s2)
Strict concavity of h implies
h
(
s1w1 + s2w2
s1 + s2
)
>
s1h(w1) + s2h(w2)
(s1 + s2)
.
Thus, with sufficiently little discounting, if w′2 satisfies (9), then δw
′
2 < w1 + δw2.
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